My first assignment, as a Law Enforcement Specialist in the United States Air Force, was in Izmir, Turkey. We didn't have an actual base there. We were Town Patrol in the City of Izmir, with jurisdiction over all U. S. Military personnel.
This jurisdiction was "concurrent" with that of the Turkish authorities, mostly the Turkish National Police (TNP). Concurrent meant that either or both agencies could detain American Military or investigate incidents pertaining to American Military. Consequently, we spent an appreciable amount of time in TNP stations, negotiating for American Military members to be released to our custody. Traffic accidents, for instance, were often investigated by both USAF/SP's and TNP.
I give you this Readers Digest explanation of our duties in order to somewhat clarify our situation there. We were unarmed (Status of forces Agreement), Uniformed patrol within one of the largest cities in Turkey, during a time of already advanced and growing terrorist activity. If we were in a situation that might need firearms, we had to call on TNP or Turkish military for help.
I asked Google AI about the effect the Iran Hostage Incident had on events in Izmir:
Larry: I was U.S. Air Force Law Enforcement in Izmir during the Iranian hostage crisis. How much effect did the events in Iran have on what I experienced as an AFSP on the streets of Izmir?
(GAI):
As a U.S. Air Force Law Enforcement officer in Izmir during the Iranian Hostage Crisis (1979–1981), your experience on the streets was shaped by a "perfect storm" of regional instability and local political violence.
While the hostage crisis was centered in Tehran, its effects in Izmir were tangible, primarily through the lens of heightened security and a spike in anti-American sentiment.
The crisis transformed the daily duties of Air Force SPs from standard law enforcement to high-stakes force protection.
Target on Your Back: The seizure of the embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, made every U.S. military member in the region a potential high-value target for kidnapping or assassination by local radical groups looking to show solidarity with the Iranian revolutionaries.
Billeting Security: The bombing at the Kordon Hotel, in Izmir, in November 1980 was a direct consequence of this era's volatility. Such military-leased facilities were "soft targets" that required constant Police overwatch.
2. Radical Leftist Solidarity
The hostage crisis emboldened Turkish militant groups like Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left) and the Turkish People’s Liberation Army (TPLA).
Anti-NATO Sentiment: These groups viewed the U.S. presence in Izmir as an imperialist occupation. They used the momentum of the Iranian Revolution to justify attacks on U.S. property, such as the firebombing of the Rod and Gun Club in Izmir.
Psychological Warfare: Protests in Izmir often featured the same "Death to America" rhetoric and flag-burnings seen in Tehran, designed to intimidate U.S. personnel on the streets.
3. The "Desert One" Aftermath (April 1980)
The failed rescue attempt, Operation Eagle Claw, had a specific psychological impact on U.S. forces stationed in neighboring Turkey.
Vulnerability: The failure at Desert One on April 24, 1980, was a massive blow to U.S. prestige and morale. For an SP on the streets of Izmir, this often translated into increased boldness from local agitators who perceived the U.S. military as "weak" or "ineffectual".
Intelligence Alerts: Following the failure, there were widespread fears of Iranian-backed retaliatory strikes against other U.S. bases in the region, likely keeping your unit on a hair-trigger for months.
4. The 1980 Military Coup Intersection
The climax of the hostage crisis coincided with the September 12, 1980, Turkish Military Coup.
Martial Law Collaboration: As a Law Enforcement officer, you likely had to navigate a complex relationship with the new Turkish military authorities. While the coup initially "quieted" the streets by arresting thousands of radicals, it also meant you were operating in a city under strict martial law, where even minor misunderstandings could escalate into international incidents.
(GAI):
As a U.S. Air Force Law Enforcement officer in Izmir during the Iranian Hostage Crisis (1979–1981), your experience on the streets was shaped by a "perfect storm" of regional instability and local political violence.
While the hostage crisis was centered in Tehran, its effects in Izmir were tangible, primarily through the lens of heightened security and a spike in anti-American sentiment.
The crisis transformed the daily duties of Air Force SPs from standard law enforcement to high-stakes force protection.
Target on Your Back: The seizure of the embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, made every U.S. military member in the region a potential high-value target for kidnapping or assassination by local radical groups looking to show solidarity with the Iranian revolutionaries.
Billeting Security: The bombing at the Kordon Hotel, in Izmir, in November 1980 was a direct consequence of this era's volatility. Such military-leased facilities were "soft targets" that required constant Police overwatch.
2. Radical Leftist Solidarity
The hostage crisis emboldened Turkish militant groups like Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left) and the Turkish People’s Liberation Army (TPLA).
Anti-NATO Sentiment: These groups viewed the U.S. presence in Izmir as an imperialist occupation. They used the momentum of the Iranian Revolution to justify attacks on U.S. property, such as the firebombing of the Rod and Gun Club in Izmir.
Psychological Warfare: Protests in Izmir often featured the same "Death to America" rhetoric and flag-burnings seen in Tehran, designed to intimidate U.S. personnel on the streets.
3. The "Desert One" Aftermath (April 1980)
The failed rescue attempt, Operation Eagle Claw, had a specific psychological impact on U.S. forces stationed in neighboring Turkey.
Vulnerability: The failure at Desert One on April 24, 1980, was a massive blow to U.S. prestige and morale. For an SP on the streets of Izmir, this often translated into increased boldness from local agitators who perceived the U.S. military as "weak" or "ineffectual".
Intelligence Alerts: Following the failure, there were widespread fears of Iranian-backed retaliatory strikes against other U.S. bases in the region, likely keeping your unit on a hair-trigger for months.
4. The 1980 Military Coup Intersection
The climax of the hostage crisis coincided with the September 12, 1980, Turkish Military Coup.
Martial Law Collaboration: As a Law Enforcement officer, you likely had to navigate a complex relationship with the new Turkish military authorities. While the coup initially "quieted" the streets by arresting thousands of radicals, it also meant you were operating in a city under strict martial law, where even minor misunderstandings could escalate into international incidents.
Now, I said all that to say all this...
The weak and ineffective response by our President at the time, Jimmy Carter, caused a lasting contempt by Iranian extremists for U.S. military, foreign policy or National Security. It's simple to get a list of all the terrorist incidents either perpetrated by or directly funded by the Iranian "Government" in the ensuing 47 years.
Even back then, in private, we talked about what it meant to us that our response to the hostage takeover was so anemic. Our most often heard sentiment (and one a friend had silkscreened on a T-shirt) was: "Iran! Nuke 'em 'til they glow!"
The current attacks in Iran today, in my opinion, should have occurred 47 years ago. This is definitely one place where I share the sentiment of the majority of Iranian citizens when I say: "USA! USA! USA!"
Even back then, in private, we talked about what it meant to us that our response to the hostage takeover was so anemic. Our most often heard sentiment (and one a friend had silkscreened on a T-shirt) was: "Iran! Nuke 'em 'til they glow!"
The current attacks in Iran today, in my opinion, should have occurred 47 years ago. This is definitely one place where I share the sentiment of the majority of Iranian citizens when I say: "USA! USA! USA!"
Incidentally, as an aside, I am a ham radio operator and am on several ham radio FB groups. I have seen several posts talking about the current re-surfacing of short wave radio transmissions from Iran, since their internet is pretty much locked down. (Good old analog radio to the rescue again!) Anyway, in a significant number of these transmissions, you can hear cheering crowds in the background or even as the focus of the broadcast. It isn't U.S. "propaganda" that the Iranian people are in support of our attacks. Sad that our own people don't care what has been happening to the people of Iran over the last 50 years or so.
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